TOP SECRET

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3rd Meeting

SUBSTANCE OF DISCUSSIONS

at

STATE-JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MEETING
HELD IN ROOM 2C-925, THE PENTAGON BUILDING
ON TUESDAY, 6 FEBRUARY 1951, AT 3:00 P.M.

PRESENT

General Bradley
General Hoyt
General White
Admiral Sherman
Admiral Radford
Admiral Davis
Admiral Wooldridge
Admiral Blandy
Admiral Lalor

Mr. Nitze
Mr. Rusk
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Jessup
Mr. Gleason
Mr. Tufts
Mr. Ferguson

TOP SECRET

MR. RUSK: If we cannot get an agreement then a stalemate is important in terms of possible fissions within the Peiping regime. There are people even within the Peiping regime who are concerned about the course of events.

GENERAL BRADLEY: I believe that we are forced into the third course of action for some time. The Chinese Communists will probably feel compelled to attempt once more to drive us out. If we can halt that attempt, then we can try, I believe, for an agreement with some chance of success.

GENERAL HAISLIP: It will be very important to build up the ROK forces so far as possible.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: What is your view about the possibilities of fission within Communist China? We have been very much interested in some of the reports that we have been getting from Communist China. There are indications which support both interpretations.

MR. RUSK: There is still a lack of cohesion within Communist China. Some of the resistance elements stem from Formosa. Some of the resistance elements are

both

both anti-Communist and anti-Chiang. There are some differences within the regime. Some of the members of the regime have anxieties regarding Korea, Manchuria, Mongolia, and Sin Kiang, especially as regards their relations between Communist China and the Soviet Union in these areas. There are, therefore, some strains within the Peiping regime which might be useful to us. In our view, if we do not find a way to bring down the regime in a year or two, then the regime will probably be with us for a long time to come. There are great difficulties in persuading the various resistance elements to get together on a common program.

MR. NITZE: The Communists have the only tight political organization within China. There have been some splits in the regime, but, in our view, these groups tended to pull together after the rejection of the "cease fire." I would agree that there was not much possibility of a "cease fire" in the near future. I think General Bradley is right on that. I do think that two or three weeks ago the Chinese Communists wanted to find some way out if they could.

MR. RUSK:

MR. RUSK: Perhaps it would be useful to have a special meeting on this problem.

MR. MATTHEWS: I think the Korean adventure is getting less and less popular in Communist China.

GENERAL BRADLEY: All that we can do for the present is to continue fighting and to punish them as severely as possible. We are in a stalemate now. There is not much point in trying to get an agreement now. I think that we hurt our position by trying to get a "cease fire" when the fighting was going against us. We will have to kill a good many more Chinese before they will be ready to talk again. The more punishment we inflict, the easier it may be to get an agreement.

MR. MATTHEWS: Do you expect to continue this punishment by fighting where we are now?

GENERAL BRADLEY: Yes, I do not think there is anything to be gained by going north.

MR. MATTHEWS: To go north would cause political difficulties.

GENERAL BRADLEY: There are no restrictions on General Ridgway in this connection, but I do not believe that

MR. MATTHEWS: We will probably have to take the selective commodities approach.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: My political view--if I am permitted to have one--is that the most effective way to approach this problem is via sanctions. We need sanctions which will be whole-heartedly enforced by the United Nations.

AMBASSADOR JESSUP: Of course, we will run directly into the problem of Great Britain and Hong Kong.

GENERAL BRADLEY: Much of Hong Kong's industry is directed inland.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: We have already encountered difficulties in enforcing the economic blockade. Certain cargoes of the Isbrandtsen Line have been back-tracked to Bombay and it is very difficult to trace these things and to make sure that the blockade is effective.

GENERAL BRADLEY: Are there any more points with reference to a blockade which we need to discuss?

MR. MATTHEWS: Our views seem very similar to yours.

GENERAL BRADLEY: Let's turn to the problem of reconnaissance. This falls into two parts: reconnaissance along the coast and reconnaissance into Manchuria. We were flying coastal reconnaissance missions

missions until late last summer. We took a good many pictures and detected concentrations of junks and got information on lines of communication etc. Because of our concern at that time to keep China out of the war, we refrained from taking many actions such as attacks from the important dams and coastal reconnaissance. Since the Chinese Communists are now fighting in Korea, the question arises whether we should continue to restrict photo reconnaissance along the coast. There is also a question of whether we should take pictures in Manchuria. We recognize that this would be more dangerous. We also recall that all of the nations cooperating with us in Korea forbade hot pursuit. It seems doubtful that they would go along with reconnaissance into Manchuria. I do not know how they feel about coastal reconnaissance.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Of course action along the coast would not be U.N. action. As regards Manchuria Chinese aircraft are now flying across the border. Therefore it has seemed to us that the restriction against Manchurian reconnaissance was outmoded.

AMBASSADOR JESSUP: How wide is the coast-line?

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: That depends on the speed of the aircraft and weather.

GENERAL BRADLEY

GENERAL BRADLEY: ...and now fast the planes can get out.

AMBASSADOR JESSUP: How deep into Chinese territory would our planes go?

GENERAL BRADLEY: This problem involves the weighing of advantages against risks. It is important to find out what can be gained.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Of course, we are ~~directing~~ suggesting reconnaissance by stealth--not the flight of large formations.

AMBASSADOR JESSUP: Are these restrictions now hampering us in keeping track of concentrations of junks?

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Yes, we are respecting Chinese territorial waters. Our position in JCS is that we are being too careful now in view of the fact that the Chinese Communists are fighting in Korea.

MR. NITZE: We in State thought that you were checking the harbors and inlets.

MR. MATTHEWS: In fact we did not realize that you had stopped this coastal reconnaissance.

GENERAL BRADLEY: We ordered it stopped last summer on our own authority.

ADMIRAL RADFORD: Our planes are not penetrating beyond the 12 mile limit off the China coast. Off the Siberian

Siberian coast, we are keeping 20 miles away.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: I think that we should immediately fly within 3 miles of the China coast without advising anyone about it.

ADMIRAL RADFORD: I agree. Even then we would not be able to survey the large rivers and bays.

MR. NITZE: Is there much to gain from reconnaissance over Manchuria?

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: We think that there probably is.

MR. NITZE: Would that be target information etc.?

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: We are particularly interested in the air build-up.

GENERAL BRADLEY: It is important to find out what the air build-up is because, if we were hit during any withdrawal from Korea, it would raise havoc with us.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: We would not be so unhappy about this problem if we had not brought it up when we were being meticulous in our conduct towards the Chinese Communists. Perhaps it is time to release the restrictions. We believe that it would help General MacArthur.

MR. NITZE: I think we would like to have some time to think about the question of reconnaissance over Manchuria. The big question seems to be what we would run into and how we might mitigate any adverse consequences.

GENERAL BRADLEY

GENERAL BRADLEY: We would be apt to run into combat if we flew into Manchuria.

GENERAL LANDON: We have already lost two aircraft in this area.

GENERAL WHITE: I think that the problem is somewhat less important now that our forces have fallen back some distance to the south.

LT. KITZE: May we take some time to consider this? We are quite clear that reconnaissance over the coast is desirable but we would like to think about Manchuria.

GENERAL BRADLEY: Coastal reconnaissance will be necessary in the event of a blockade.

AMBASSADOR JESSUP: If we had decided to impose a naval blockade, we would not worry about reconnaissance for we would by the fact of a blockade be exercising belligerent rights.

MR. MATTHEWS: I think you should go ahead with what you were doing last summer.

GENERAL BRADLEY: What were we doing last summer--were we keeping to the 3-mile limit?

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: I think there was a little free-wheeling--we got in rather deep once.

GENERAL BRADLEY

GENERAL BRADLEY: Of course, we imposed this restriction on ourselves. I believe that we keep 20 miles away from Siberia.

AMBASSADOR JESSUP: We would be concerned only if the reconnaissance penetrated far inland and if it were constant. If we established a regular pattern, there might be adverse consequences and it might create unfortunate impressions.

GENERAL BRADLEY: It is possible that the consequences might be good. I believe that it would please General MacArthur for it would tend to draw Chinese Communists' attention southward. As you probably know, there have been two or three press stories out of Tokyo recently about the use of Chinese Nationalist forces. Apparently General MacArthur's headquarters is putting these stories out--I suppose with the purpose of diverting Chinese Communists' attention away from Korea.

Do you wish to study this question more?

MR. MATTHEWS: Only as regards Manchuria.

GENERAL BRADLEY: Then you believe that it is appropriate along the coast? When will it become important?

ADMIRAL RADFORD: I think it is important right now.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: We ought to get the pattern established now in order to detect ~~Declare~~ deviations.

GENERAL BRADLEY